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WATCHING THE WATCHERS:
ENEMY COMBATANTS IN THE
INTERNMENT’S SHADOW
JERRY KANG*
I
INTRODUCTION
Punish him, yes. But please try to understand the defense’s point of view that there is
a corporate responsibility.
1

—Lawyer for Ivan “Chip” Frederick, court-martialed for his crimes at Abu Ghraib

We are fighting an indefinite war on terror. In considering the policy and
practice of this war, the history of the Japanese American internment looms
large. That history exists as moral parable as well as legal precedent. In Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial,2 I sought a careful remembering
of the internment by holding the judiciary accountable for its actions. That article detailed how the Supreme Court in the 1940s, using techniques often praised
as “minimalist,” avoided accountability on the part of the President and the
Congress. With a straight face, the Court held that the internment camps were
never authorized by the political branches; rather, they were an ultra vires frolic
committed by a civilian agency called the War Relocation Authority (WRA).
Denying Prejudice also demonstrated how, in the 1980s, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals whitewashed history in the very act that granted extraordinary relief to the brave wartime litigants who had challenged internment. In
granting the writ of error coram nobis and thereby overturning Gordon Hirabayashi’s decades-old convictions, the Ninth Circuit simultaneously excused the
wartime Supreme Court of any wrongdoing. The official explanation inscribed
into the federal reports was that the Court had been duped by unethical execu-
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tive branch lawyers. Adopting this convenient story allowed another denial of
accountability, this time on the part of the judiciary itself.
Part II of this article briefly summarizes these arguments and describes how
the judiciary dodged accountability in both the wartime and coram nobis cases.
Part III shifts focus to today’s war and examines whether the judiciary is repeating this strategy of denial in the current “enemy combatant” cases. In other
words, is the judiciary exploiting similar interpretive and procedural tactics in
order to feed the dogs of war while creating plausible deniability for those who
unleashed them? The net assessment is mixed, with good reasons for both optimism and alarm. To be clear, the goal of this article is not to provide any systematic model for judicial review of military action against terrorist threats.3 Instead, its ambitions are more modest and focused: to help the judiciary invoke
the tragedy of internment as honestly as possible, without naïveté or selfserving denial.
II
DENYING PREJUDICE
A. The Wartime Cases
The wartime Supreme Court decided four cases on the Japanese American
internment—Hirabayashi,4 Yasui,5 Korematsu,6 and Endo.7 In these cases, the
Court deployed an arsenal of procedural, interpretive, and avoidance techniques to achieve the following goals:
(i) to not interfere with the internment which, although distasteful, made common
sense and entailed what might be called “acceptable losses”; yet, (ii) to withhold explicit approval of the indefinite detention of concededly loyal U.S. citizens, a practice
too difficult to reconcile with official commitments to “equal justice under law”; and

3. Such models have been put forth elsewhere in the academic literature. See, e.g., Tania Cruz,
Civil Liberties Post-September 11: Judicial Scrutiny of National Security: Executive Restrictions of Civil
Liberties When “Fears and Prejudices Are Aroused,” 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 129, 152-70 (2004) (advocating a “two-tiered framework for reviewing national security civil liberty restrictions that would first
determine whether a heightened level of judicial scrutiny is appropriate and then articulate the executive’s burden of evidentiary proof”); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2004) (arguing that, during times of war, the courts have exercised scrutiny
that focuses on the institutional processes used to make the decisions at issue, rather than on the content of the underlying rights); Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004) (proposing an equity
approach to judicial review); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited—Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National
Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 7 (1986) (suggesting that “except
when martial law is legitimately in force, the standard of judicial review of government restrictions of
civil liberties is not altered or attenuated by government claims of ‘military necessity’ or ‘national security’ as justifications for the restrictions”).
4. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
5. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
7. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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(iii) simultaneously, to avoid tarnishing its own reputation or that of the other federal
branches, either by what it said or did. Put bluntly: Let the military do what it will,
8
keep its own hands clean, and forge plausible deniability for others.

1. Curfew: Hirabayashi and Yasui
The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.9 Soon thereafter, in February 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order
9066, which granted the Western Defense Command broad powers to exclude
people from designated military areas.10 Pursuant to this order, General John L.
DeWitt issued a curfew in March 1942 that applied to all enemy aliens as well as
to Japanese American citizens (called “non-aliens”).11 Later, the military issued
a series of over 100 exclusion orders, which funneled Japanese Americans,
neighborhood by neighborhood, first into temporary assembly centers, then to
what were euphemistically called “relocation” camps.12 Public Law 503, passed
by Congress, criminalized any disobedience.13
To create a test case, Gordon Hirabayashi disobeyed the curfew and evacuation orders.14 In district court, he was convicted of violating these military orders, and was given concurrent sentences for each violation. The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which certified the relevant legal
questions to the Supreme Court. The Court took the unusual step of calling up
the entire case to be decided as if on appeal.15
The decision came down on June 21, 1943. Eager to make the case as simple as possible, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone sua sponte latched onto the happenstance of Hirabayashi’s concurrent sentences and segmented the two convic16
tions. In a classic exercise of judicial minimalism, Justice Stone observed that

8. Kang, supra note 2, at 965.
9. For a more detailed account of the internment process, see id. at 937-42; see also id. at 937 n.8
(listing historical sources).
10. The Order read:
I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he
may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he
or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be
excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall
be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.
Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
11. Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Apr. 2, 1942).
12. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 288 (“Beginning on March 24, 1942, a series of 108 Civil Exclusion Orders were issued by General DeWitt pursuant to Public Proclamation Nos. 1 and 2.”). In my analysis, I
use terms such as “curfew,” “evacuation,” and “relocation” ironically, as terms of art necessary to understand the technicalities of the cases. See Kang, supra note 2, at 941 n.37.
13. See Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Military Areas or Zones, Restrictions Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173
(1942) (criminalizing disobedience of regulations of movement and actions in military areas).
14. Historical details regarding Hirabayashi appear in PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 87-93
(1993).
15. For more procedural details of the case, see Kang, supra note 2, at 944.
16. Throughout this article, I make reference to “minimalism,” “minimalist virtues,” and “judicial
minimalism.” These terms refer to a theory of judging initially advanced by Alexander Bickel, then
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affirming one conviction would make discussion of the other unnecessary.17 Not
surprisingly, he focused on the easier question of curfew rather than the more
troubling topic of evacuation.
Having narrowed the issue, the Court proudly pronounced that
“[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality.”18 But the curfew that applied to Hirabayashi, even though he was a
United States citizen, was not enacted solely because of his ancestry. Instead,
the military had “ample ground” to be worried that ethnically-affiliated
"sleeper cells"19 would aid a Japanese invasion.20 According to the Court, this
was plain racial common sense.21 As a result, mere curfew—a relatively minor
inconvenience during military crisis—was deemed a reasonable burden for
Japanese Americans to bear.
Yasui presented the identical curfew issue and was affirmed on the same
grounds, on the same day.22 In the end, with many tens of thousands of Japanese Americans behind barbed wire in prison camps, with no threat of invasion
on the West Coast,23 the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court thought it appropriate to address only the matter of curfew, and held that curfew was all right by
them.

elaborated upon by Cass Sunstein. Roughly speaking, a minimalist judge explains only that which is
absolutely necessary to justify an outcome and strives to leave as many matters undecided as possible.
Such a theory of judging could make aggressive use of legal doctrines that permit avoidance of specific
issues or even entire cases. For a more detailed discussion of “minimalist virtues,” and why they cannot
justify the Supreme Court’s analysis in the wartime cases, see Kang, supra note 2, at 965-75.
17. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) (“Since the sentences of three months each
imposed by the district court on the two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary
to consider questions raised with respect to the first count if we find that the conviction on the second
count, for violation of the curfew order, must be sustained.”).
18. Id. at 100.
19. “Sleeper cell” is the current term for small groups of traitors and saboteurs in our midst; during
World War II, the relevant term was “Fifth Column,” which was introduced during the Spanish Civil
War to represent an invisible fifth column of troops supporting Franco within the city of Madrid. See
Irons, supra note 14, at 21.
20. 320 U.S. at 94-96.
21. Id. at 101 (“We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time of
war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than
those of a different ancestry.”).
22. See Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 116-17 (1943).
23. The Battle of Midway, considered the decisive battle of the war in the Pacific, took place in
June 1942 and shifted the offensive momentum in the war from the Japanese to the Americans and
their allies.
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2. Exclusion: Korematsu
Eighteen months later, on December 18, 1944,24 the Court decided the next
case: Korematsu. Would the legality of the massive detention of Japanese
Americans now be addressed? The answer was again no, because the Court redeployed the segmentation technique. Even though the exclusion order was integrally connected to Korematsu’s subsequent relocation into an internment
camp, the Court refused to see it that way. In a hyper-formalistic analysis, the
Court insisted that evacuation and relocation were two separate orders, and
that technically Korematsu had been convicted only for refusing to evacuate.25
Ignoring the government’s own concession to the contrary,26 the Court speculated that, had Korematsu obeyed the evacuation order, he might not have
ended up in a relocation camp after all.27 Then, cloaking itself in the mantle of
self-restraint, the Court explained that it should only address evacuation: “To
do more would be to go beyond the issues raised, and to decide momentous
questions not contained within the framework of the pleadings or the evidence
in this case.”28
Through segmentation, the sole question presented was whether the government could require Japanese Americans to evacuate their homes temporarily, for personal safety and national security. Framed this way, Korematsu was
burdened little more than someone evacuated from a natural disaster. In answering this narrow question, the Court again “talked the talk” of equality
without “walking the walk.” Creating the foundation for what would, according
to the conventional wisdom, become the rule of strict scrutiny, the Court trumpeted:
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity
29
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.

In application, however, the flowery words wilted into limp acceptance of timetested racial stereotypes. It turned out that “pressing public necessity” included

24. Although Korematsu had originally been certified to the Supreme Court by the Ninth Circuit
along with Hirabayashi and Yasui, there was a question whether an odd sentencing posture precluded
an appealable final judgment. A few weeks before deciding the curfew cases, the Court ruled that there
was a final order and remanded the case, instead of addressing the merits as it could have and did in the
curfew cases. See Kang, supra note 2, at 949-50 (providing procedural history).
25. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 221 (1944).
26. See Brief for the United States at 28-29, Korematsu (No. 22), reprinted in 42 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
197, 230-31 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (“[H]ad [Korematsu] obeyed all of the
provisions of the order and the accompanying Instructions, [he] would have found himself for a period
of time, the length of which was not then ascertainable, in a place of detention.”).
27. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 221.
28. Id. at 222.
29. Id. at 216. For a brief trace of the doctrinal evolution of strict scrutiny, see NEIL GOTANDA,
THE STORY OF KOREMATSU: THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CASES, IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES
Ch. 8 (Michael Dorff ed., 2004).
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assumptions of disloyalty that would today be called racial profiling. The majority could not see these crude generalizations as “racial antagonism.”30
The payoff of the segmentation technique executed in Hirabayashi was substantial. Reneging on its promise not to use Hirabayashi as precedent for the
next case,31 the Korematsu Court wrote: “In the light of the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond
the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did.”32 Through segmentation, the Court could frame the evacuation question as a minor extension on a
case already deemed constitutionally copacetic. Indeed the precedent was so
squarely on point that the Court, through double-negative circumlocutions, protested that it could not hold otherwise. As summarized in Denying Prejudice:
This segmentation technique allowed the Court to obscure its own agency and thereby
minimize responsibility for its choice. It ceded responsibility to a Supreme Court of
the past (admittedly only one year past), which had established guidance squarely on
point (even though the earlier Court had disclaimed that it was doing so). Morally dis33
turbing, but technically exquisite.

3. Relocation: Endo
The fourth and final case, Endo, was released on the same day as Korematsu. The question cleanly presented was whether the government could indefinitely detain a concededly loyal American citizen. Contrary to the first
three cases, in this final contest, the Japanese American litigant won—but not
on the grounds one might have thought. There was no holding that the executive and legislative branches of government had deprived Mitsuye Endo, an
American citizen, of her constitutional rights; rather, the Court decided the case
on administrative law grounds. It held fantastically that the WRA, which maintained the camps, was never authorized to detain Endo in the first place.34
The Court began by examining Executive Order 9066 (delegating power to
military to bar access to military areas), Executive Order 9012 (creating the
WRA), and Public Law 503 (creating criminal penalties for violating duly issued
military regulations).35 Reading literally, the Court saw no mention of “detention” in any of these documents.36 The Court further invoked the minimalist
doctrine of constitutional avoidance: Steer clear of statutory readings that raise
constitutional questions. Accordingly, the Court presumed that the political

30. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
31. See id., at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The Court is now saying that in Hirabayashi we did
decide the very things we there said we were not deciding.”).
32. Id. at 217–18 (emphasis added).
33. Kang, supra note 2, at 955.
34. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302-04 (1944).
35. Id. at 285-90.
36. Id. at 300–01. The Court made an explicit finding that “[n]either the Act nor the orders use the
language of detention.” Id. at 300.
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branches were “sensitive to and respectful of the liberties of the citizen.”37 Indeed, the Court assumed that “lawmakers intended to place no greater restraint
on the citizen than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the language they
used.”38 To read the relevant documents otherwise
would be to assume that the Congress and the President intended that this discriminatory action should be taken against these people wholly on account of their ancestry
even though the government conceded their loyalty to this country. We cannot make
such an assumption. As the President has said of these loyal citizens: “Americans of
Japanese ancestry, like those of many other ancestries, have shown that they can, and
want to, accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us, making their own
valuable contribution to the national wealth and well-being. In vindication of the very
ideals for which we are fighting this war it is important to us to maintain a high standard of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority as of all
39
other minorities.”

In dissent, Justice Roberts sharply criticized the majority for “ignor[ing]
patent facts”40 and for “hiding [its] head in the sand.”41 The Court’s blindness
cannot be attributed to faithful adherence to some consistent interpretive
methodology. Contrast how the Court addressed similar authorization questions in Hirabayashi. There, the Court saw authorization for curfew as applied
to citizens, even though Executive Order 9066 and Public Law 503 made no
mention of such authority and delegated power in the vaguest of terms.42 In
other words, when convenient to see political authorization, the Court had Xray vision; when embarrassing, the Court saw no evil.
Endo was thus a Pyrrhic victory, in that her freedom was granted through an
exculpation of President Roosevelt and Congress.43 Also, Endo technically released no one else: The day before the opinion’s release—a Sunday of all
days—the War Department somehow knew to rescind its curfew, evacuation,
and exclusion orders unilaterally.44
B. The Coram Nobis Cases
The Japanese American redress movement of the 1980s was stunningly successful. The Executive branch apologized for its role in the internment.45 Con-

37. See id. at 303–04. Earlier in the opinion, the Court stated that, “[w]e have likewise favored that
interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality. . . . We must assume that the Chief Executive and members of Congress, as well as the courts, are
sensitive to and respectful of the liberties of the citizen.” Id. at 299-300.
38. Id. at 300.
39. Id. at 303-04 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 309 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 89-90 (1943).
43. One might ask why the Court in Korematsu bothered to segment off evacuation from relocation, when the latter would be addressed in Endo, released the same day. My answer appears infra Part
III.B.1.b.
44. See Kang, supra note 2, at 964 (suggesting that Justice Frankfurter likely notified the War Department prior to the decision, allowing it to rescind its orders the day before).
45. Proclamation No. 4417, “An American Promise,” 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (Feb. 19, 1976).
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gress paid reparations.46 And the courts vacated the convictions of Korematsu,
Yasui, and Hirabayashi in the extraordinary coram nobis cases.47 These reversals were based on “smoking gun” evidence,48 unearthed at the national archives, which demonstrated the lack of military necessity for the internment.
At first glance, the story of redress warrants unqualified celebration—but first
impressions can be deceiving.
Functionally, the writ of error coram nobis is cousin to the writ of habeas
corpus, which was irrelevant because no petitioner remained in custody. The
coram nobis writ clearly required a showing of extraordinary circumstances
amounting to a complete miscarriage of justice.49 What was uncertain was
whether the writ also required actual prejudice—a showing that the wartime
Court would have ruled otherwise but for the suppression of evidence.
Korematsu was the first coram nobis case to be heard, in 1984. The government filed a nonresponsive two-page letter that encouraged the court to vacate
the conviction without granting the writ, and simply to “put behind us the controversy.”50 District Court Judge Marilyn Patel declined this invitation and instead granted Korematsu’s petition.51 For her, the gross miscarriage of justice
was obvious. As for the prejudice issue, Judge Patel concluded that it was not
necessary as a matter of law: “Whether a fuller, more accurate record would
have prompted a different decision cannot be determined. Nor need it be determined. Where relevant evidence has been withheld, it is ample justification . . . that the conviction should be set aside.”52 This was true victory.
By contrast, in Yasui, the next coram nobis case that was decided, District
Court Judge Robert Belloni complied with the government’s request.53 With
the now familiar rhetoric of self-restraint, he simply vacated Yasui’s criminal
conviction without granting the writ. Minoru Yasui died before his appeal
could be heard.

46. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-383 (Aug. 10, 1988), 102 Stat. 903 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989d (2000)).
47. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Yasui v. United
States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
48. That evidence—including DeWitt’s original Final Report; exculpatory memoranda from the
FCC, FBI, and the Office of Naval Intelligence; and the bowdlerized footnote in the government’s brief
in Korematsu—is summarized in Kang, supra note 2, at 976-79. Reproductions of the suppressed evidence can be found in ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL L. IZUMI, JERRY KANG &
FRANK H. WU, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT 300-09 (2001).
49. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1954) (stating that coram nobis “included
errors of the most fundamental character,” such that “[o]therwise a wrong may stand uncorrected
which the available remedy would right”).
50. Government’s Response and Motion, Korematsu (No. CR-27635W), reprinted in JUSTICE
DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 210-12 (Peter Irons ed.,
1989).
51. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
52. Id. at 1419.
53. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 48, at 318.
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The final coram nobis case was Hirabayashi’s, which the federal government
litigated to the hilt, in sharp contrast to the prior cases. After a full, weeks-long
evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a split decision and vacated Hirabayashi’s conviction on evacuation, but not on curfew. The different results
turned on the question of prejudice. The gross miscarriage of justice was clear,
but, contrary to Judge Patel’s reading of the law, Judge Donald Voorhees held
summarily that actual prejudice had to be shown.54 In his view, the suppressed
evidence would have altered how the Supreme Court handled the evacuation,55
but not the curfew,56 conviction.
The appeal was heard in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by Judges Mary
Schroeder, Alfred Goodwin, and Jerome Farris.57 On the question whether actual prejudice was legally required, the court—again invoking the “minimalist
virtues”—declined to answer. Why? Because, regardless of whether prejudice
was necessary as a matter of law, sufficient prejudice had been shown as a matter of fact.58 This finding meant affirming the trial court’s vacation of Hirabayashi’s evacuation conviction. It also meant reversing the trial court on the curfew
conviction as clearly erroneous, because, according to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court would have reversed that conviction too.
By conventional wisdom, this amounted to total vindication for Hirabayashi.
But probe beneath the surface: By finding prejudice as a matter of fact, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the official story that the wartime Supreme Court was an
innocent, misled by duplicitous lawyers. The Court did nothing wrong; it was
merely tricked. In the 1940s Endo opinion, the Court avoided holding Roosevelt and Congress accountable; in the 1980s Hirabayashi opinion, the Ninth Circuit completed the “circle of absolution,”59 and ensured that the wartime Court
would also have nothing to account for. But, this official story of “wartime
Court as innocent babe” is revisionist.60 As damning as the “smoking gun” evidence uncovered in the 1980s was, the Court would not have ruled otherwise on
the question of evacuation, and certainly not on that of curfew. To suggest otherwise is to revise history in order to insulate the Court from corporate responsibility.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit did not have to reach this result.61 Given the
precedent of the time, the court could simply have said that prejudice was not
necessary to the coram nobis writ, allowing Hirabayashi to win without any

54. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (citing United States
v. Dellinger, 657 F.2d 140, 144 n.9 (7th Cir. 1981)), rev’d in part, 828 F.2d. 591 (9th Cir. 1987). There
was no mention of the contrary ruling in Korematsu’s coram nobis case, which had concluded that
prejudice was not necessary.
55. See id. at 1457.
56. See id.
57. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987).
58. Id. at 603-04.
59. Kang, supra note 2, at 986.
60. See id. at 985-95 (explaining why this conception of the wartime Court is revisionist).
61. For a discussion of other paths the Ninth Circuit could have taken in the case, see id. at 995-97.
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comment on, much less bleaching of, history. This is, in fact, current coram nobis law in the Ninth Circuit, post-Hirabayashi.62 Still other options, none of
which required accepting historical falsehoods, were available.63
***
The full argument is much longer and nuanced.64 Still, this sketch conveys
the basic reasons why the wartime Court should be held to account for more
than simply bowing to the pressure of military exigency. It also explains why
the coram nobis “victory” should be viewed ambivalently, for the courts artfully
dodged corporate responsibility. How the judiciary can manipulate legal constructs to deny political and moral responsibility is a central but unappreciated
lesson of the internment. Have we finally learned that lesson? Or do we still sit
in darkness?
III
ENEMY COMBATANTS
Civil libertarians and progressives have generally applauded how the “enemy combatant cases”65 have been decided.66 In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme

62. Under current Ninth Circuit coram nobis law, actual prejudice is not a legal requirement. See
id. at 996.
63. In the alternative, the Ninth Circuit could have held that actual prejudice was necessary, but
since the Supreme Court would have affirmed Hirabayashi’s convictions even with the suppressed evidence, no relief could be granted. This would have produced a loss for Hirabayashi but nevertheless
vindicated truth. If this medicine was too bitter to swallow, still another possibility would have allowed
speaking truth about history while ultimately vacating Hirabayashi’s convictions—to establish a rule of
law that “[a]ctual prejudice is normally required to issue the writ of coram nobis; however, in cases of
extraordinary manifest injustice, the writ will nonetheless issue.” The full argument appears in the appendix to id. at 1006-13.
64. If the reader has objections or seeks additional points of clarification, I hope that Kang, supra
note 2, addresses them.
65. In this study, the term “enemy combatant cases” refers to three cases decided by the Supreme
Court in 2004: Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), and
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). In addition, because the Court decided Padilla on jurisdictional grounds, I include in my analysis the substantive portion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
opinion in that case.
66. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1639-42 (2004) (Padilla as “an emphatic reaffirmation of the importance of the rule of law”); Timothy Lynch, Power and Liberty in Wartime, 2004 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 23, 24 (“Fortunately, in a triumph for liberty, the Supreme Court decisively rejected the
president’s reading of the law.”); David Cole, Comment, No Blank Check, THE NATION, July 19, 2004,
at 4 (“The broader significance of the rulings lies in their ringing rejection of the argument that to defeat terrorism, the executive must have unfettered discretion.”); David Ignatius, Editorial, The Balance
of Justice Amid a War, WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at A15 (“The world went wobbly after Sept. 11. . . .
Thanks to wise judges, the United States and the world may finally be returning to solid ground.”); Anthony Lewis, Editorial, The Court v. Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A27 (“It was as profound a
day in the court as any in a long time. The justices did what they have often shied away from doing: said
no to the argument that the title commander-in-chief means that the president can do whatever he says
is necessary to win a war.”); Jonathan Turley, Commentary, A Near Miss For Key Rights, L.A. TIMES,
June 29, 2004, at B13 (“The outcome Monday may be the ultimate testament to founding father James
Madison, who said he wanted to design a system that would work even if it were run by less than angelic beings.”). But see Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantánamo Cases,
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49, 68 (“The Guantánamo cases may be seen as a reaction, indeed an overre-
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Court held that federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
challenges of enemy combatants detained in Guantánamo Bay.67 In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the Court held that an American citizen, even one caught on foreign
soil during combat, deserves rudimentary procedures to determine the legality
of his detention.68 Finally, in Padilla v. Rumsfeld , the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, the highest court to have spoken on the substance of Padilla’s facts,
held that the President lacked unilateral power to detain indefinitely a United
States citizen caught on American soil.69 Do the internment cases cast any different light on this upbeat assessment?
A. Repetition?
1. Segmentation
Recall how the Supreme Court in the 1940s exploited the “segmentation”
technique to avoid obstructing the military70 and also to obscure the Court’s
own agency.71 One could sketch a similar strategy in the enemy combatant context. For example, the Court could have found a way to stagger deciding the
cases from easiest to hardest, from Rasul (aliens, on foreign soil), to Hamdi
(citizen, caught on foreign soil), and finally to Padilla (citizen, caught on
American soil). Each case could have been ex ante distinguished from the
other, but the affirmance of the prior case could have been ex post used as guid-

action, to the broad claims the administration put forth in the name of executive power. . . . [T]he administration missed an opportunity to distinguish between types of detainees and put forth a more
modest argument. . . . [T]he federal courts are now going to interject themselves into many different
aspects of the detention process.”).
67. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699; see also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481
(D.D.C. 2005) (holding that the procedures to determine whether Guantanamo Bay detainees are “enemy combatants” violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 152, 173 (D.D.C.2004) (holding that military commissions cannot try Guantanamo detainees
for war crimes).
68. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (“We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a
fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”).
69. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003). This case was reversed by the Supreme
Court for lack of jurisdiction. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2727 (“We therefore reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand the case for entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice”). Given
this reversal, the opinion carries no precedential weight; however, it still provides the reasoning of the
highest court to have addressed the merits and thus warrants inclusion in my analysis. Padilla refiled
his habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, which was recently
granted. See Padilla v. Hanft, 2005 WL 465691 (Feb. 28, 2005) (concluding that detention was not
authorized by Congress and that the President lacked unilateral power to detain Padilla).
70. Recently, Eugene Kontorovich has made the same point about what I call segmentation. See
Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 755, 786-87 n.99 (2004) (referring to the general tactic of delay and avoidance in national security contexts as “Vallandigham-Hirabayashi abstention”).
71. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist concedes “certain disingenuousness” in the sequencing of the
cases, which produced differing results for the litigants Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo, when there
was no reason to think that they had differing loyalties to the United States. See WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 202 (1998).
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ing precedent for affirming the next case—precisely the ploy executed in Hirabayashi and Korematsu.
Elements of a segmentation strategy can be found in the enemy combatant
cases. For example, each case distinguishes itself from the others. In Hamdi,
for instance, the Supreme Court accepted for purposes of that case a definition
of “enemy combatants” that clearly excluded Padilla.72 Conversely, in Padilla,
the Second Circuit carefully distinguished the facts of Hamdi.73 In addition, the
decisions reflect choices (if not manipulation) in timing. Although all three
opinions were issued on the same day, the Supreme Court delayed addressing
the merits of Padilla, the Administration’s most difficult case, by deciding the
case on jurisdictional grounds.74 Even if this was entirely correct judging, this
result is reminiscent of the timing manipulation in Korematsu.75
However, mere elements do not make the strategy. The critical difference is
that Hirabayashi lost, whereas Hamdi more or less won. In the wartime cases,
Hirabayashi’s loss on curfew provided legal momentum for Korematsu on
evacuation. By contrast, in the enemy combatant cases, Hamdi’s partial victory76 short circuits any similar incrementalist strategy. If the Court had affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s opinion and analysis, then the specter of a gradualist
extension to the facts of Padilla would have loomed.77 Happily, that is not the
case.

72. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (“It has made clear, however, that, for purposes of this case, the ‘enemy combatant’ that it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was ‘part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States’ there. . . . We therefore answer only the narrow question before us:
whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is authorized.”) (citation omitted).
73. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 721 n.29 (“As we have previously noted, Judge Wilkinson, one of the
authors of Hamdi III, remarked in his later concurrence to the decision not to rehear Hamdi III en
banc that ‘[t]o compare this battlefield capture to the domestic arrest in Padilla v. Rumsfeld is to compare apples and oranges’“) (citation omitted). As explained above, the Padilla case is making its way
back up through the federal courts a second time. See supra note 69. The District Court for South
Carolina also sharply distinguished Hamdi from Padilla. See Padilla, 2005 WL 465691, at *6.
74. On this point, the Justices sparred over the proper interpretation of Endo. In Endo, there was
some question of whether Endo had properly exhausted her administrative remedies (by not completing the forms required by the WRA leave procedures) and whether jurisdiction remained since she had
been moved to another camp. The government did not pursue the former argument at the High Court
in the Endo litigation; accordingly, the Supreme Court addressed the latter argument and concluded
that subsequent movement of the petitioner did not destroy jurisdiction. See Kang, supra note 2, at 959,
n.142. The Padilla majority interpreted Endo for a narrow exception to the “immediate physical custodian” rule. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2721 (holding that a district court with jurisdiction over a habeas
petitioner does not lose jurisdiction simply because the petitioner is no longer within its territorial jurisdiction). In dissent, Justice Stevens read Endo for “a more functional approach that focuses on the
person with the power to produce the body.” Id. at 2733 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. For more details on the manipulations in Korematsu, see Kang, supra note 2, at 949-50, nn.91,
93.
76. To be sure, what counts as a “win” or a “loss” is complicated. But no one doubts that the Supreme Court’s opinion afforded Hamdi more rights than recognized by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and expressly denied the Executive Branch a “blank check.”
77. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1002-03 (raising this fear of segmentation before the Supreme Court
decided the enemy combatant cases).
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This assessment confirms the truism that legal techniques such as segmentation generally lack intrinsic political valence. What matters instead is how these
techniques are utilized, with what self-knowledge, and toward what ends. In
sum, the judiciary is not using segmentation in the enemy combatant cases to
allow some gradual erosion of civil liberties that avoids recognition of judicial
agency or political accountability. So far, there are reasons to be optimistic:
The glass looks half-full.78
2. Authorization
In Endo, the Supreme Court manipulated the question of executive and
congressional authorization to deny accountability. By finding that the fullblown internment had never been authorized by the President and Congress,
the suffering of Japanese Americans was never attributed to the actors in fact
responsible. Congressional authorization also lies at the heart of the enemy
combatant cases. And in them, historical references to the internment abound,
including prominent citation to Endo. Is the judiciary again being willfully
blind to authorization in order to avoid accountability?
Answering this question requires first identifying the instances in the enemy
combatant cases in which “no authorization” was found. In Hamdi, that is principally Justice Souter’s opinion, with passing agreement in Justice Scalia’s opin-

78. To be careful, or perhaps paranoid, I should flag one potential segmentation strategy left open.
Justice O’Connor made it clear that the term “enemy combatant” was poorly defined, and accepted for
purposes of this litigation that it was “an individual who . . . was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to
the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against
the United States’ there.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004). Further, on the critical
question of whether Hamdi enjoyed a right to counsel, Justice O’Connor declined to answer. See id. at
2652 (“He unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on remand. No further consideration of this issue is necessary at this stage of the case.”). On this point,
some commentators have mistakenly read in greater constitutional protections than what the Court
granted. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 1641 (“[T]he Justices were explicit that Hamdi must
be given a meaningful factual hearing [which a]t a minimum . . . includes . . . the right to be represented
by an attorney”).
In subsequent cases, pursuant to a segmentation strategy, the following could be decided:
• the definition of “enemy combatant” can be expanded slightly to include the likes of
Padilla (by not requiring foreign capture);
• the Court decides that although notice and opportunity to rebut claims according to some
reasonable standard of proof are required, detainees have no right to counsel;
• if the Authorization of Military Force (AUMF), discussed further infra, authorized
Hamdi’s detention, it must have authorized Padilla’s detention, which was consistent with the
post-9/11 fear of domestic terrorism.
Is it possible that Hamdi’s partial victory sets up a Padilla loss in which both branches of government
are seen as authorizing the detention of a U.S. citizen, on American soil, as long as he is granted primitive process—but without benefit of counsel?
Perhaps this is too much of a stretch. Specifically, on the last point of authorization, five Justices
seem to suggest that the AUMF does not authorize Padilla’s detention. Three Justices joined Justice
Stevens in his dissent in Padilla, in which he wrote that there was no authorization. See Padilla, 124 S.
Ct. at 2735 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Breyer, who found authority as to Hamdi’s
detention, Souter, and Ginsburg). However, the body text associated with that footnote was equivocal,
pointing out that “reasonable jurists may answer in different ways.” Id. at 2735. In addition to these
four, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Hamdi, made clear that there was no authorization even as to
Hamdi. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ion. In Padilla, that is the Second Circuit majority opinion. Since Padilla has
been reversed and remanded on jurisdictional grounds,79 the analysis here focuses on Justice Souter’s opinion.
Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter began his analysis with the NonDetention Act (NDA), which states: “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”80
He provided the relevant context of the NDA’s passage. In 1971, Congress repealed the Emergency Detention Act (EDA) of 1950, a Cold War statute, to
lessen the chances of another Japanese American internment.81 But because the
EDA provided some procedural protections, legislators worried that repeal
would leave citizens in some ways even worse off. Accordingly, Congress enacted the NDA to complement the EDA’s repeal and to require clear congressional authorization before detention of any United States citizen.82 Moreover,
as Justice Souter pointed out, the NDA was passed “in light of an interpretive
regime that subjected enactments limiting liberty in wartime to the requirement
of a clear statement . . . [as] unmistakably expressed in Ex parte Endo.”83
Applying this clear statement standard, Justice Souter could not find authorization to detain Hamdi in the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) enacted by Congress after September 11.84 As he pointed out, there
was no mention of detention. Moreover, numerous other governmental tools
could be used against the likes of Hamdi. And, by negative implication, the
passage of the Patriot Act, which limits detention of alien terrorists to seven
days, militated against statutory interpretations that would grant weaker protections to alleged citizen terrorists.85
This opinion resembles Endo in that both find “no authorization” to detain,
but the similarity is only superficial. As detailed in the Appendix, finding “no
authorization” does not always undermine accountability. In Endo, the finding
of no authorization was made essentially after the fact—after the burden had
79. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004).
81. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2654 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment) (pointing out legislative history mentioning the concentration camps).
82. Referring to explicit legislative history on point, Justice Souter also rejected the government’s
argument that the NDA did not apply to military detentions. Id. at 2655-56.
83. Id. at 2655.
84. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
85. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, took a very different line of argument in his Hamdi
dissent, but agreed for similar reasons that the AUMF did not authorize Hamdi’s detention:
Contrary to the plurality’s view, I do not think this statute even authorizes detention of a citizen with the clarity necessary to satisfy the interpretive canon that statutes should be construed so as to avoid grave constitutional concerns; with the clarity necessary to comport with
cases such as Ex parte Endo and Duncan v. Kahanamoku; or with the clarity necessary to
overcome the statutory prescription that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Finally, in Padilla, which addressed
the slightly different facts of an American citizen captured on American soil, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals similarly found no statutory authorization for the detention. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d
695, 718-24 (2d Cir. 2003).
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been inflicted, the dirty deed done, and the only matter remaining was to assign
responsibility. By finding no authorization, the Supreme Court placed all blame
on a little-known agency instead of on the actual political actors responsible.
Justice Roberts, concurring only in Endo’s result, described the tactic and its
consequence:
I think it inadmissible to suggest that some inferior public servant exceeded the authority granted by executive order in this case. Such a basis of decision will render
easy the evasion of law and the violation of constitutional rights, for when conduct is
called in question the obvious response will be that, however much the superior executive officials knew, understood, and approved the conduct of their subordinates, those
subordinates in fact lacked a definite mandate so to act. It is to hide one’s head in the
sand to assert that the detention of [Endo] resulted from an excess of authority by
86
subordinate officials.

Justice Souter’s opinion does precisely the opposite. His conclusion is more
injunctive than rhetorical, in the sense that it is not after the fact, but in the
thick of action, and it would specifically command the military to stop continuing detention. Further, by requiring Congress to speak explicitly if it wants to
empower the military to detain Hamdi, Justice Souter’s opinion encourages political accountability.
Consistent with this interpretation is Justice Souter’s attitude toward the
constitutional avoidance doctrine. In Endo, to justify its ludicrous statutory interpretation, the Court waxed eloquent about this doctrine. Consider, by contrast, what Justice Souter wrote on the constitutional question of whether the
President could unilaterally authorize Hamdi’s detention: “I need to go no further; the Government hints of a constitutional challenge to the statute, but it
presents none here.”87 Nonetheless, he continued: “I will, however, stray across
the line between statutory and constitutional territory just far enough to note
the weakness of the Government’s mixed claim of inherent, extrastatutory authority under a combination of Article II of the Constitution and the usages of
war.”88 This willingness to engage in dictum—in order to send clear signals to
the political branches about constitutional right and wrong—does not reflect
the rhetorical style and complicit tone heard in the wartime cases.89
Hamdi provides still more evidence that the same doctrinal technique (for
example, finding no authorization) can be used for varying ends (for example,
to undermine or to promote accountability). It also provides additional cause
for optimism: Perhaps the glass is three-quarters full. Any optimism must, of

86. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 309 (1944) (Roberts, J., concurring).
87. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2659 (Souter, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Similarly, in the Second Circuit’s Padilla opinion, the majority expressly refused to invoke the
canon of “constitutional avoidance.” The government had encouraged reading the NDA to apply only
to civilian, not military, detentions in order to avoid the constitutional question of the limits of Article
II power. But the court rejected the invitation and explained that “the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.” Padilla, 352 F.3d at 721 (citations omitted). But students of Endo know that ambiguity can be found when convenient.
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course, be tempered by the fact that Justice Souter did not command a plurality,
much less a majority.90
B. Rehabilitation?
The manner by which the enemy combatant cases invoke, apply, and distinguish the internment precedents (almost always ignoring the coram nobis cases)
makes possible their rehabilitation. Precedents once disdained or forgotten
could be repositioned rhetorically and legally in a more favorable light, through
citation practices and subtle omissions. How are the internment cases being rehabilitated?
1. Misremembering Endo
a. Naive readings. Prompted by the briefs and perhaps by Pat
Gudridge’s recent article,91 judges are now remembering Endo. Unfortunately,
there have been some flat-out wrong recollections. For instance, in analyzing
whether the NDA applies to military detentions, the Second Circuit wrote in
Padilla:
Because the World War II detentions were authorized pursuant to the President’s war
making powers as well as by a congressional declaration of war and by additional congressional acts, see Endo, 323 U.S. at 285-90, the manifest congressional concern about
these detentions also suggests that section 4001(a) limits military as well as civilian de92
tentions.

According to Endo, however, the World War II detentions were not authorized
by the President and Congress. To be sure, curfew was authorized. So was
evacuation, and maybe even temporary detention until loyalty could be determined. But according to the Endo Court, the internment camps writ large—
notwithstanding annual funding by Congress—were never approved by the political branches. At least, that is the official line.93
More worrisome is the naïve manner in which Endo is cited for the proposition that citizen detention must be clearly authorized. For instance, in the
Hamdi opinion, Justice Souter repeatedly cites Endo at face value for the
propositions that Congress never authorized the internment camps during
World War II94 and that a clear statement for citizen detention is necessary.95
90. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, which was joined by three other members of the Court,
found authorization for Hamdi’s detention. Justice Thomas, in his dissent, agreed on this authorization
point. That means a total of five Justices found authorization. Further analysis of these “yes authorization” opinions, and their meaning in terms of accountability, is provided in the Appendix.
91. See Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003).
92. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 720.
93. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (“For we conclude that, whatever power the War
Relocation Authority may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens
who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure.”).
94. Justice Souter offered no qualification of the Court’s findings in Endo:
[T]he internments of the 1940’s were accomplished by Executive action. Although an Act of
Congress ratified and confirmed an Executive order authorizing the military to exclude individuals from defined areas and to accommodate those it might remove, see Ex parte Endo, 323
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The Second Circuit’s Padilla opinion displays an even more naïve reading.
In Padilla, the court rejected the government’s argument that congressional appropriations for detention camps constituted authorization. The court’s authority was Endo, which held that expenditures cannot be interpreted as ratification
unless there is precise earmarking of funds for the specific challenged action.96
But that claim when it appeared back in Endo was preposterous. Although
Congress for years funded the internment camps, the Endo Court remained
willfully blind to ratification.97 The Court manufactured a hyper-specificity requirement—what Justice Roberts called “an element never before thought essential to congressional ratification”—solely to shield Congress from responsibility. It is this hyper-specificity requirement that the Second Circuit Padilla
majority relies on.98
Here, then, is cause for dissonance. How can opinions that promote accountability cite to Endo, which was deviously designed to deny accountability?
Perhaps experiencing dissonance is itself naïve since, as this article has already
observed, legal doctrines generally lack a single political valence.99 To use Justice Jackson’s now clichéd “loaded gun” metaphor, a gun used against civil liberties (in Endo) can be picked up six decades later and used in favor of civil liberties (in the enemy combatants “no authorization” opinions). To reverse
another tired saying, one can use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s
house.
U. S. 283, 285-288 (1944), the statute said nothing whatever about the detention of those who
might be removed, id., at 300-301; internment camps were creatures of the Executive, and confinement in them rested on assertion of Executive authority, see id., at 287-293.
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2654 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
95. Id. at 2656 n.2. Justice Thomas also reads Endo at face value. See id. at 2677-78 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
96. See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724. The court quoted directly from Endo:
[The appropriations statute] authorizes nothing beyond the expenditure of money. Endo unquestionably teaches that an authorization of funds devoid of language “clearly” and “unmistakably” authorizing the detention of American citizens seized here is insufficient. See 323
U.S. at 303 n.24 (acknowledging that Congress may ratify past actions of the Executive
through appropriations acts but refusing to find in the appropriations acts at issue an intent to
allow the Executive to detain a citizen indefinitely because the appropriation did not allocate
funds “earmarked” for that type of detention).
Id.
97. Endo, 323 U.S. at 304 n.24. The Court implausibly insisted:
[T]he appropriation must plainly show a purpose to bestow the precise authority which is
claimed. We can hardly deduce such a purpose here where a lump appropriation was made for
the overall program of the Authority and no sums were earmarked for the single phase of the
total program which is here involved. Congress may support the effort to take care of these
evacuees without ratifying every phase of the program.
Id.
98. In ruling on the refiled habeas petition, the District Court for South Carolina made the same
naïve read of Endo. See Padilla v. Hanft, 2005 WL 465691 at *10 (Feb. 28, 2005) (quoting Endo’s language that “We must assume, when asked to find implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive
authority, that the law makers intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly and
unmistakably indicated by the language they used.”).
99. See supra Parts III.A.1 and 2.
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Still, truth is at stake here, and the truth of Endo must not be denied.100 Justice Souter’s citation to Endo for the proposition that Congress did not authorize the internment camps reinscribes a falsehood. And, in some ways, it is more
dangerous when that reinscription occurs in an opinion that promotes accountability, which invites celebration, not skepticism. After a few more repetitions,101 who will remember anything but the official line?102 Who will remember
the truth of Endo?
b. Remember Endo? But the truth of Endo is contested. Specifically,
Pat Gudridge remembers Endo much more favorably, as an essential counterpoint to Korematsu, which was decided on the same day. His thesis is complicated and argued in rich, evocative prose. But boiled down, the essential elements of his claim are: (i) Korematsu is not as important as believed—because
Endo was decided the same day;103 (ii) Endo is better than remembered—it was
a “constitutional” decision that freed the Japanese; (iii) the two cases act as mutually repelling counterpoints that must be equally weighted. Because of its influence,104 Gudridge’s thesis warrants detailed engagement.

100. I made a similar point about the value of truth in my critique of the coram nobis cases in Denying Prejudice. See Kang, supra note 2, at 997-1004.
101. Numerous amicus briefs filed in the enemy combatant cases offered naïve readings of Endo.
See, e.g., Brief of the ACLU et al. at 16-17, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696);
Brief for Professors of Constitutional Law et al. at 15-16 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004)
(No. 03-1027); Brief for Original Congressional Sponsors of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(A) at 22, Padilla (No. 031027); Brief for the Center for National Security Studies and the Constitution Project at 9, Padilla (No.
03-1027).
102. Consider, for example, the comments of Judge Shira Scheindlin, who writes: “For example, the
Court decided Hirabayashi in the thick of World War II. Just one year later—but after American forces
landed on Normandy beach and in the Philippines, and the Japanese threat had all but subsided—the
Court essentially reversed itself in Endo.” Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due
Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 839-40 (2004).
There was no “reversal” in Endo except in the most formal sense. For other liberal triumphalist
readings of Endo in the amicus briefs, see, e.g., Brief of the American Bar Association at 6-7, Hamdi
(No. 03-6696) (suggesting that the judiciary vindicated its “essential obligation to provide American
citizens with meaningful review of executive detentions” in Endo); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation et al. at 15, Padilla (No. 03-1027) (citing Endo as authority that the Japanese Americans had been
“detained based solely on racial consideration”); see also Alan M. Dershowitz, WHY TERRORISM
WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 162 (2002) (“There is,
however, an important difference between the detention of Japanese-American citizens and torture.
The detentions were done openly and with presidential accountability; torture would be done secretly,
with official deniability.”) (emphasis added).
103. To avoid misunderstanding, let me be clear that Gudridge posits Korematsu as an “infernal
baseline,” Gudridge, supra note 91, at 1934, and assures us that remembering Endo will not make us
forget the wrong of internment. Id. at 1939.
104. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3, at 21-23 (adopting Gudridge’s analysis wholesale).
The authors analyze Endo even more triumphantly than Gudridge:
Evacuation and restrictions on mobility reflected military judgment (faulty or pernicious as
they may have been) of what was necessary for security. Detention, however, reflected political and policy judgments, not military ones. Despite the emphasis Korematsu has had at the
expense of Endo, the fact is that even during this bleak episode, the Court continued to resist
executive branch actions that, at most, rested on political and policy, rather than military,
judgments.
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Gudridge’s appreciation of Endo stems largely from the fact that it freed the
Japanese.105 However, this result deserves less weight than he gives it: the eventual freedom of loyal Japanese Americans after Roosevelt was re-elected and
after military exigency had passed was never in question. Indeed, by late 1944,
the WRA was more concerned about how it would get internees out of the
camps than how it could keep them in. At greater issue was how the Court
would make an accounting in 1944 for what the government had done. Indeed,
since release was inevitable, the best thing that Endo could do for the Japanese
Americans was to provide a reckoning of who did what to whom—to pronounce that (i) democratically elected leaders had authorized their imprisonment and that (ii) this imprisonment violated their constitutional rights. Endo
did neither.
First, by finding no authorization, the Court attributed the internment
camps to the lowly WRA. On this there is no dispute. Second, although
Gudridge makes creative arguments on why Endo should be viewed as a constitutional case,106 the Court’s plain language makes clear that Japanese Americans’ constitutional rights were not actually vindicated: “We are of the view that
Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty. In reaching that conclusion we do
not come to the underlying constitutional issues which have been argued.”107
Id. at 21; see also Patrick Baude, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime After
September 11?: An Essay on the Spirit of Liberty in the Fog of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1321,
1331 (2004) (remarking on how the author thought about Korematsu “before I read Patrick Gudridge’s
recent study of the Endo case”).
105. This is not technically true since the military unilaterally rescinded its orders the day before
Endo was handed down. Gudridge notes this fact. Gudridge, supra note 91, at 1935. That said, the
reason the military acted on the specific day it did was to beat the judicial opinion to the punch. See
also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 3, at 21 (“Korematsu as an actual legal decision turns out to have
had no practical effect . . . . By the time the Court was deciding Korematsu . . . the practical question
was whether continued detention was permissible. And on that, Endo was decisive . . . . The initial
evacuation had long ago taken place; the Court could not undo that or its consequences. All the Court
could do, as a practical matter, was order the end to continued detention. And that is what it did.”).
106. Examining the drafting history of Justice Douglas’ opinion, Gudridge notes the deletion of language that more clearly demonstrates a strategy of constitutional avoidance. Gudridge, supra note 91,
at 1956. Relying on this sort of excavation, especially when the plain meaning of the opinion’s text is
accessible, is a questionable interpretive methodology; I am uncertain that we want the meanings of
Supreme Court opinions to change as we find, in the future, red-line annotations in version-controlled
word processing documents. Further, to the extent that this is an attempt to discern authorial intent,
Douglas’ own spoken words are telling and are explicitly to the contrary. As acknowledged by
Gudridge, Douglas makes plain that he could not forge a majority to decide the case on constitutional
grounds; therefore, he wrote the opinion the only way he could, on statutory grounds. Id. at 1953.
In making his case that Endo was a constitutional decision, Gudridge further contends that the
structure of Douglas’ opinion does not reflect the typical organization of constitutional avoidance arguments. The conventional organization, he suggests, is to lay out the various preconstitutional interpretive possibilities, then in order to avoid some constitutional question or concern, the Court selfconsciously exercises discretion to adopt a second-best choice. Even if such a cookie-cutter template
were uniformly used, there is another explanation why the Court did not list potential alternatives: the
only other alternative was to suggest that President Roosevelt and Congress had authorized Endo’s detention. To then publicly proclaim an exercise of judicial discretion, instead of invoking the rhetoric of
(false) necessity, would have undermined the objective of shielding the political branches of responsibility. Denying corporate responsibility is not done most effectively by alerting your audience that that
is what you are doing.
107. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (emphasis added).
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One final argument should be dispositive. Under Gudridge’s favorable
reading of Endo, what explains Korematsu’s tortured and implausible segmentation of evacuation from detention? Why go through such machinations, ignoring the government’s own concession,108 if on the very same day the Court
would rule in Endo that indefinite detention was illegal? Was it just to create a
riddle to be solved in the law reviews six decades later?
No, the segmentation was necessary in the Court’s dodge of corporate responsibility. Recall that the Court held that Endo’s detention was never authorized by the President or Congress. The only way that the Court could reach
this “no authorization” conclusion was to segment detention from evacuation,
which was obviously authorized. If the two orders were instead seen as facets of
an organic whole, the Court could not have divined differential authorization in
favor of evacuation but against detention. Korematsu formally severed what
was in reality unseverable—not to create a “Liang gate”109 but to open the trap
door for Endo’s escape.110
Rather than emancipation and vindication for Japanese Americans, Endo
offered exculpation for the political branches. Endo should not be seen as the
nemesis of Korematsu, or as “zhengfanshu” (front and reversed writing).111 In
less recondite terms, Korematsu and Endo fit “hand in glove,” reflecting a general strategy of tolerating significant “collateral damage” to racial minorities
(them), in order to protect the mainstream (us), and then covering up the unpleasantries. Instead of immiscible constitutional swirls, the two cases reveal a
consistent pattern of denying corporate responsibility.
c. Ironic embrace. Endo’s clear statement rule need not be abandoned
as the fruit of some poisonous tree. Korematsu’s current doctrinal status provides a useful analogy. Law students are often perplexed how Korematsu can
be disparaged like Plessy v. Ferguson,112 but still never be overruled. The riddle
is formally solved by distinguishing the legal rule from its application. As a legal rule, Korematsu remains good law, in the sense that it has never been reversed and also in the sense that “strict scrutiny” is arguably what should be applied to racially prejudiced classifications. This explains how Korematsu can be

108. See Brief for the United States, supra note 26, at 28-29, Korematsu (No. 22).
109. Drawing on art historian Wu Hung’s work, Gudridge teases out a cryptic metaphor of the two
cases as symbols on the pillars of a Chinese funeral gate. Gudridge, supra note 91, at 1965-68.
110. I made the same argument in Denying Prejudice:
If the evacuation and detention issues were fused together and considered in unison, the
Court would have had a much more difficult time explaining how one facet of the indivisible
program had been authorized by the executive branch and Congress while another facet was
not. In contrast, by decoupling the two components, it became possible for the Court to see
military authorization to evacuate, and not see War Relocation Authority authorization to detain indefinitely. The ACLU attorneys that coordinated the wartime cases before the Supreme
Court clearly held this view.
Kang, supra note 2, at 965 n.172.
111. Gudridge, supra note 91, at 1966.
112. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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prominently cited as recently as 1995 in the Supreme Court’s affirmative action
jurisprudence.113
By contrast, Korematsu acts as “anti-precedent” in its application of the legal rule to the facts. The application failed not only because the Court was fed
bad data, as demonstrated by the coram nobis cases, but also because the Court,
influenced by its racial schemas,114 deferred to the racial common sense of the
times. This contextualized understanding separates the baby from the bath water. The “strict scrutiny” rule can be preserved while the rubber-stamping application of the rule can be flushed.
The same should be done with Endo. Its “clear statement” legal rule (perfectly fine) should be distinguished from its historical application (deceitful).
The legal rule, never having been overruled, remains good law. But a naïve rehabilitation of Endo means that its “clear statement” rule could be deployed
across the board, perhaps to deny accountability the next time.
To put a fine point on it, suppose that the military commits a spate of horrific tortures, in the light of some ambiguous statute or Executive Order that
permits highly coercive interrogation. After the fact, a court could excuse the
President and Congress of any wrongdoing and instead blame low-level soldiers
by finding that no one ever authorized quite this kind of barbarism. Using what
authority? See Endo, which is being revivified in the enemy combatant cases
without due care. Now, the glass appears only half-full.
2. Resurrecting Hirabayashi
Are the other wartime opinions also being resurrected? Not Korematsu as
applied. For example, Justice O’Connor’s Hamdi opinion explicitly cites to Justice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu, which argued that there must be more rigorous judicial review.115 And to the credit of the Department of Justice, the only
wartime case cited in its briefs in the enemy combatant cases was Endo.116

113. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, Essay, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court Moves from Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for Asian Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 165,
176-78 (1996).
114. For a more detailed discussion of racial schemas, see Kang, supra note 2, at 955-58. See generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497-1528 (elaborating a model of
racial mechanics that draws on racial schemas infused with implicit bias).
115. “[I]t does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own timehonored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented
here. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 233-234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (‘[L]ike
other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must
subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other
interests reconciled’).” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649-50 (2004).
116. The government cited Endo on matters of habeas jurisdiction, entirely appropriate in the
Padilla discussion. See Brief for Petitioners at 21 n.8, 26 n.12, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711
(2004) (No. 03-1027). The government also contested Endo’s clear statement rule to the enemy combatant cases on the grounds that Endo addressed civilian agency detention, in contrast to detention by
the military. See Brief for Respondents, Hamdi (No. 03-6696), at 22 n.7; Petitioner’s Brief at 45-46,
Padilla (No. 03-1027). In Padilla, the government argued that here, the President had explicit authorization to detain enemy combatants under 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), which “grants specific authorization for
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Hirabayashi, however, is being reawakened. In the Supreme Court’s opinions, it makes only a cameo appearance: in Justice Thomas’s dissent in Hamdi,
for the proposition that the judiciary should defer to the factual predicates of
executive branch decisionmaking as virtually conclusive.117 But it is featured
more prominently in the Second Circuit’s Padilla opinion. The Second Circuit
made clear that its conclusion turned on the fact that Congress had not authorized Padilla’s detention, and that therefore, within the familiar Youngstown
framework,118 the President was acting at the nadir of his power. However, the
court added, “[t]o be sure, when Congress and the President act together in the
conduct of war, ‘it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.’ Hirabayashi v. United States.” 119 In
other words, on the authority of Hirabayashi, Padilla’s detention would pose no
constitutional problems if Congress simply said so.120
Imagine what happens when the next shoe drops. Suppose that Congress
does speak explicitly, in the heat and fog of a major terrorist attack, and authorizes massive race or ethnicity-based detention. Even if Congress is not so explicit, imagine the courts’ finding authorization in some vaguer pronouncement
in a repeat of the Hirabayashi strategy. According to the Second Circuit and
Justice Thomas, the judiciary has essentially no role to play.121 This deference
abandons a critical check on governmental abuse, especially majoritarian tyranny. 122
the military to expend appropriated funds of the detention of persons ‘similar to prisoners of war,’“ as
opposed to the Congressional “lump appropriation” for the WRA’s “overall program” which led to the
ruling of no authorization in Endo. See id. at 39 n.15 (No. 03-1027). Also in Padilla, the government
claimed that Endo’s clear statement rule did not apply, because (i) the Court is not being asked to find
implied powers in a delegation of authority and (ii) the restraint imposed on Padilla (that is, detention)
is not greater than that contemplated by the AUMF’s authorization of “all necessary and appropriate
force.” Id. at 42 n.17 (No. 03-1027).
117. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
119. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 713 (2d Cir. 2003).
120. Jason Weida points out that Hirabayashi was cited in Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework. Jason Collins Weida, A Republic of Emergencies: Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36
CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1432 (2004).
121. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 1639 (pointing out that the Second Circuit did not answer to
what extent the executive and legislative branches, acting in unison, can suspend the Bill of Rights for
citizens deemed enemy combatants).
122. In this brief article, I cannot offer a more methodical defense of this plain statement. However,
since 9/11, there has been an explosion of scholarship analyzing the proper role of judicial review in
times of terror that does discuss its merits as a check on governmental abuse. Compare Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004) (treating “extraconstitutional” action by
the executive as inevitable and proposing a framework of political controls in times of crisis), and Mark
Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 304
(2003) (exercise of power during emergencies should be extraconstitutional) with Laurence Tribe &
Patrick Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004) (criticizing Ackerman’s
framework as unworkable) and David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s
Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753 (questioning Ackerman’s lack of faith in judicial review during times of
crisis); see also Mark Tushnet, Response: Issues of Method in Analyzing the Policy Response to Emergencies, 56 STAN. L REV. 1581 (2004) (deferential judicial review during times of crises reflects rebalanced cost/benefit analysis); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 605 (2003) (arguing that judicial deference in times of crisis does not lead to “ratcheting down”
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How is it possible that Hirabayashi can be so casually cited when cases like
Korematsu (as applied) are placed in the same abyss as Dred Scott and Plessy?
It is partly because, although Korematsu is valenced negatively in our constitutional culture, Hirabayashi is largely unknown. Its positive citation in the enemy combatant cases increases the chances that Hirabayashi will slip into mainstream constitutional discourse without due diligence.123 Before that happens,
here is a reminder of Hirabayashi’s meaning:
• It was about segmentation, which sliced and diced issues to make room
for a delayed Korematsu.
• It was about finding authorization in ambiguous text to excuse the political branches from saying distasteful things explicitly.124
• It was about rejecting any notion that citizens should have to bear the
burdens of war in common.125
• Finally, Hirabayashi was about the Supreme Court cruelly accepting an
impossible Catch-22 for racial minorities. In the case, the Supreme
Court embraced the logic that, because the United States had mistreated the Japanese, it was rational to assume that they would be more
disloyal, which in turn made them a greater security threat. With heartless precision, it stated:
There is support for the view that social, economic and political conditions which have
prevailed since the close of the last century, when the Japanese began to come to this
country in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have in large
126
measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population.

civil liberties and decisionmaking based on “irrational fear”); Bernard Bell, Marbury v. Madison and
the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197 (2003) (judicial review should push difficult questions to politically accountable branches); John Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 429-30 (2003) (judicial review should be highly deferential, and “provide options” to executive branch in times of war).
123. Hirabayashi surfaced repeatedly in the amicus briefs filed with the Court, and was cited approvingly by a number of the amici. See, e.g., Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, U.S. Representatives Joe Barton, Walter Jones, and Lamar Smith, and Allied Educational Foundation at 9, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Center for Law &
Justice at 2, 5, 16-17, 23-24, 26, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027); and Brief for
Senators John Cornyn and Larry E. Craig at 17, Padilla (No. 03-1027).
124. There is a long history of such chicanery as applied to Asian Americans. See, e.g., Keith Aoki,
No Right to Own: The Twentieth-Century Alien Land Laws as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV.
37, 55-71 (1998) (discussing the Supreme Court’s upholding of Western states’ alien land laws, which
targeted Japanese immigrants using the term “aliens ineligible to citizenship,” in order to escape the
“federal judicial or legislative ire” that an explicitly racial bar would attract).
125. Six years later, Justice Jackson would make the general argument with characteristic eloquence: “The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.” Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949).
Drawing on the same common sense insight, Gordon Hirabayashi had argued that curfew should
apply to all citizens alike or to none at all. But, the Court explained that such burdening of other
Americans was irrational and unnecessary, and that the Constitution did “not compel so hard a choice.”
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 95 (1943).
126. Id. at 96. The footnote to this quotation listed in encyclopedic detail all the de jure and de facto
discriminations to which the Japanese had been subject. Moreover, as the Japanese American Citizen’s
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Hirabayashi’s creep back into respectability should be stopped. At the level
of social norms, Hirabayashi should be stigmatized so that attorneys, especially
government attorneys, pause before citing it as support for its argument.127
Judges and their law clerks, before cutting and pasting language from briefs into
opinions, should likewise linger and question its authority, as conceived in the
broadest sense.
Preventing Hirabayashi’s casual rehabilitation would have been easier if the
coram nobis cases had been decided differently. If truth had been spoken to
power, each citation to the Hirabayashi of the 1940s would have to be followed
by a “but see” signal to the Hirabayashi coram nobis case of the 1980s with a
searing parenthetical. That parenthetical would explain that the Supreme
Court, even if it had been given all the suppressed evidence, would have nonetheless affirmed Hirabayashi’s convictions. If this were our official history, Hirabayashi would be more difficult to rehabilitate. But this never happened, and
Hirabayashi emerges from our collective ignorance. The glass is half-empty.
IV
CONCLUSION
Perhaps I am an alarmist. Only an academic would pick through the technical details of the internment, coram nobis, and enemy combatant cases to identify minutiae about segmentation, authorization, actual prejudice, and citation
practices to cobble together some accountability bogeyman. Instead, the big
picture reveals only good news: Korematsu bad (racist);128 Endo good (Japanese

League (JACL) argued in its amicus brief: “By [this line of reasoning], the Nazi treatment of the Jews is
vindicated, for the Jews of Germany had suffered civil and social disabilities and therefore, by the sadistic turn of logic, should have been ripe for treason to the Reich precisely as Herr Hitler declared.”
Brief of the JACL at 64-65, Hirabayashi (No. 870).
In his own brief, Yasui added: “[I]n days to come the Government may argue that the JapaneseAmericans have not been assimilated into American life because during World War II they were
locked up in concentration camps.” Brief for Appellant at 34, Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115
(1943) (No. 871).
127. Cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998) (pointing out the anti-Asian racist underpinnings of
the plenary power cases).
128. For example, Eric Muller notes that eight of nine current sitting Supreme Court Justices “have
either written or concurred in opinions describing Korematsu as an error.” See Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and
9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 571, 586 (2002). As evidence, Muller points to statements in Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990), Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). (Justice Souter is
not listed, but Muller properly attributes that simply to a lack of occasion. See Muller, supra, at 586
n.75.) On the one hand, Muller is correct that, besides the Chief Justice, the current sitting Justices
have not provided apologia for the results in Korematsu. On the other hand, we should be cautious
about reading too much into the cases that Muller cites.
In two of the cases, the statements by the more conservative Justices discrediting Korematsu are deployed to change constitutional doctrine to strike down affirmative action programs. In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Kennedy dissents (with Justice Scalia joining) from the majority’s decision not to apply
“strict scrutiny” to federal affirmative action in broadcast license distribution. He points out that
“[e]ven strict scrutiny may not have sufficed to invalidate early race-based laws of most doubtful validity, as we learned in Korematsu.” 497 U.S. at 633. In Adarand, the dissent’s view in Metro Broadcasting
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Americans win); coram nobis opinions good (convictions vacated); and enemy
combatants cases good (courts have jurisdiction and some legal process required). In caricature, the objection goes, “Don’t Worry, Be Happy.”129 Stated
more aggressively, the objection suggests that clear victories are being needlessly undermined as only partial, perhaps Pyrrhic. Let the people enjoy Endo.
Let them enjoy the coram nobis opinions. Who cares about non-ironic embraces of precedent, whatever that might mean? Who cares about citations to
Hirabayashi in Padilla when the petitioner wins? No one else sees a problem;
why stir up trouble and look for one? The glass, the objection insists, is halffull.
But my concerns are not invented. The techniques of segmentation and selectively discerning authorization can be exploited in today’s war to deny accountability. An inaccurate remembering of the internment cases also risks
noncontextual resurrections of Endo and Hirabayashi—again, with real-world
consequences.
More fundamentally, truth matters. What happened in the internment was
the governmental acceptance and propagation of a racist lie—that persons of
Japanese descent in America were traitors because of their race. The truth was
otherwise, and that truth has surfaced over time. Only a passionate commitment to the truth has driven courageous efforts, such as the coram nobis litigation, to further expose the truth. My analysis of the 1940s and 1980s cases is
that truth has been revealed only partially, and the judiciary—supposedly the
most principled branch of government—has dodged a truthful accounting.
Even at the level of symbolism, this argument matters. For many Americans—some of whom are unaware of even the internment itself—a technical
academic inquiry may have no impact. But the target audience is lawyers and
law-informed policymakers who are guiding the war on terror. For them, I am
contesting the broad-brushed symbolism that is taught in highly stylized and re-

becomes the majority, and Justice O’Connor writes (with Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joining) that, “Korematsu demonstrates vividly that even ‘the most rigid scrutiny’ can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification. . . . Any retreat from the most
searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurring in the future.” 515
U.S. at 236. Many would not take great solace in conservative Justices saying bad things about Korematsu in order to strike down most race-based affirmative-action programs. See, e.g., YAMAMOTO ET
AL., supra note 48, at 22; Gabriel J. Chin, Sumi Cho, Jerry Kang & Frank Wu, Beyond Self-Interest:
Asian Pacific Americans Toward A Community Of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4
UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129, 142 (1996).
The third case that Muller cites, Stenberg, addressed the constitutionality of a ban on partial-birth
abortion procedures. Justice Scalia, in dissent, compared the majority’s striking down of the ban as
akin to Korematsu and Dred Scott. See 530 U.S. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Harsh words indeed,
which should make Justice Scalia’s subsequent embrace of Korematsu difficult. But these words were
not written in a national security context, and no doubt the next time, the facts of military exigency will
be distinguishable from World War II. Recall that the legal rule now understood to have been set by
Korematsu remains good law: As recently articulated in Grutter v. Bollinger, “the lesson of Korematsu
is that national security constitutes a ‘pressing public necessity.’“ 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2351 (2003).
129. For a decidedly more pessimistic view about what has happened post 9/11, see, e.g., Karen
Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173 (2004)
(focusing on loss of immigrants’ rights).
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dacted form in typical constitutional law classes. The internment cases are often taught as embodying the traditional liberal vision of the rule of law working
itself pure by correcting errors made by a few bad apples—as Endo corrected
Korematsu, as the coram nobis opinions corrected the wartime cases, and so on.
I offer a more critical counter-story that hones in on the judiciary, which, under
the law’s magnificent cloak, has covered its institutional derrière through deft
legal exegesis. That counter-symbol—not of law working itself pure, but of
judges dodging corporate responsibility—is what we must remember during
these tortured times.
Many commentators suggest that we have learned our lessons from World
War II, and something as grotesque as the internment will never happen
again.130 In some ways, this must be true, since the civil rights battles of each
generation look different from the ones of the past. Still, those who confidently
assert that we have learned our lessons must answer two questions.
First, precisely what lessons did we learn?131 In Denying Prejudice, for example, I demonstrated that no one had noticed the dark underbelly of the coram nobis opinions, which had been previously only celebrated. In the current
article, I have argued that we have misremembered Endo.132
Second, why do we assume that we learn but never forget? It is only
through constant vigilance that the internment can remain a lighthouse that
helps us navigate the rocky shores triangulated by freedom, equality, and security. We can never presume “never again.” And as judges watch over, case-bycase, how our rights survive in a climate of anger and fear, I hope they receive
guidance from the internment, as precedent and parable, without naïveté. Let
us watch them.
V
APPENDIX: AUTHORIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A. The Authorization/Accountability Matrix
Recall the central complaint about Endo: Its finding of “no authorization”
was used to deny accountability by passing off responsibility to the WRA, described as a rogue agency. Should “no authorization” thus be equated with
“undermine accountability”? Not necessarily: remember Hirabayashi. Neither
130. See, e.g., David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review in Times of Crisis, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2575 (2003) (“In short, Korematsu has not proved to be the ‘loaded weapon’ that
Justice Jackson feared. To the contrary, it has served as an object lesson in what the Court and the government ought not do in future crises.”); Gudridge, supra note 91; Scheindlin & Schwartz, supra note
102.
131. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 122, at 290 (“Although General DeWitt’s reasons for action may
have rested on racist assumptions, the decisions of the higher-ups, relying on DeWitt, were not.”).
132. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 3, at 416 (“Cases like the Steel Seizure Case and Ex parte Endo
reflect a pragmatic judiciary that understands exigency but does not lose sight of the values of equality
and integrity that assertions of exigency can obscure.”). My read of Endo is that equality was sacrificed
in order to maintain the appearance of integrity.
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Executive Order 9066 nor Public Law 503 spoke explicitly of curfews, certainly
as applied to American citizens. Nevertheless, in that case, the Supreme Court
found authorization in the ambiguous text, thereby excusing the political
branches from explicitly authorizing such burdens, even as to American citizens, solely on the basis of ancestry.133 This meant that the political branches got
what they desired without having to spell out, in distasteful detail, racial discrimination in the U.S. Code.134
To untangle the relationship between authorization and accountability, consider the following matrix:
UNDERMINE
NO AUTHORIZATION
YES AUTHORIZATION

ACCOUNTABILITY

PROMOTE
ACCOUNTABILITY

Quadrant I
Quadrant II

Quadrant III
Quadrant IV

Quadrant I is the Endo case (internment camps were not authorized, so neither
Roosevelt nor Congress could be held accountable). Quadrant II is Hirabayashi (race-based curfew was authorized even as applied to citizens, so neither the
Executive nor Congress required a more explicit green light). Depending on
the context, either finding on the question of authorization can undermine accountability.
There is also a second column, which suggests that an interpretation about
authorization can sometimes promote accountability. On the one hand (Quadrant III), finding no authorization could stop military action in its tracks and
force Congress to muster up the courage and political capital to do explicitly
what it was attempting to do implicitly. This could be called the antiHirabayashi case—what would have happened in an alternate universe if upon
challenge, curfews as applied to citizens were struck down as unauthorized.135
On the other hand (Quadrant IV), just the opposite may be true: Finding
authorization could promote accountability. This is the alternate universe’s
anti-Endo case. If the Supreme Court in Endo had held that the internment
camps were authorized by F.D.R. and Congress, then it would have had to address Endo’s constitutional claims. The political branches of government could
not have dodged constitutional censure.136

133. See Kang, supra note 2, at 963.
134. This is not to say that if such specificity were required the political branches would not have
complied with subsequent clarifications, but it was even simpler not to have to. And this could create
more plausible deniability later, as in Endo.
135. Cf. Bell, supra note 122, at 218 (characterizing clear statement rules as vindicating constitutional rights).
136. On this general point about the complexity of interpreting legislative will, Margulies notes the
conflict of interpretive norms, which encourage deference on foreign affairs and national security matters but require respect of constitutional rights. See Margulies, supra note 3, at 404-05. I agree with the
genuine difficulty of the interpretive enterprise in such contexts, but my emphasis is that, in the face of
such ambiguity and complexity, the court has and may again flex the doctrines to deny accountability.
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B. Categorizing the Opinions
This matrix helps distinguish between opinions that undermine versus promote accountability. Consider, first, the “no authorization” opinions. These
are Justice Souter’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions in Hamdi, as well as the Second Circuit majority in Padilla.137

NO AUTHORIZATION
YES AUTHORIZATION

UNDERMINE
ACCOUNTABILITY

PROMOTE

I. Endo
II. Hirabayashi

III. anti-Hirabayashi
IV. anti-Endo

ACCOUNTABILITY

Looking across the first row of the matrix, the question becomes whether these
opinions replicate the Endo (Quadrant I) gambit, which would be troubling, or
represent the anti-Hirabayashi strategy (Quadrant III), which would be heartening. Above, I explained why they fall into Quadrant III.138
However, Justice Souter’s opinion did not command a majority in Hamdi.
In fact, a total of five Justices found “yes authorization.” Justice O’Connor’s
plurality opinion139 provided the reasoning. Specifically, she found that Congress, in enacting the Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) after
the September 11 terrorist attacks, authorized the detention of Hamdi as a necessary incident to war. It made no difference that Hamdi was a citizen.140 Justice Thomas, although approaching the case quite differently, nonetheless
agreed on the matter of authorization.

NO AUTHORIZATION
YES AUTHORIZATION

UNDERMINE
ACCOUNTABILITY

PROMOTE

I. Endo
II. Hirabayashi

III. anti-Hirabayashi
IV. anti-Endo

ACCOUNTABILITY

How should we classify Justice O’Connor’s “yes authorization” opinion?
Applying the matrix, the two possibilities appear in the second row: Quadrants
II or IV. The Quadrant II (Hirabayashi) strategy undermines accountability by
stretching to find authorization under ambiguous circumstances. By contrast,
Quadrant IV (anti-Endo) promotes accountability by attributing responsibility

137. Judges Pooler and B.D. Parker were in the majority. Judge Wesley concurred in part and dissented in part. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
138. See supra Appendix, Part A.
139. Justice O’Connor was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy
and Breyer. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (“We do not reach the question whether
Article II provides such authority, however, because we agree with the Government’s alternative position, that Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.”).
140. This was not an authorization of “perpetual detention”; the fact that effective operations
against the Taliban were ongoing in Afghanistan meant that detention for the time being was congressionally authorized. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641-42.
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for lawless141 action to the responsible political actors. Its primary effect is to
speak truth to power, to force an accounting. This is what would have happened if the Endo Court had not laid all blame on the WRA.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion does not fit neatly into either Quadrant.
Viewed favorably, the opinion shows some features of Quadrant IV. The requirement of more constitutional process partly rebukes the conditions of
Hamdi’s detention. Moreover, her opinion puts Congress on notice that it has
authorized Hamdi’s detention, and if it disapproves, it should act accordingly.
Viewed less charitably, however, the opinion features various qualities of
Quadrant II. Justice Souter argues persuasively that the AUMF is ambiguous
in authorizing Hamdi’s detention. Yet, by finding authorization at least as long
as “active operations” are ongoing in Afghanistan, the Court permits detention
to continue, without Congress having to authorize expressly such citizen detention.142 Of course, some due process strings are attached—to allow for “a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”143
The fairest assessment of Justice O’Connor’s Hamdi plurality is to recognize
that it straddles the two quadrants. On the one hand, it does not clearly promote accountability, which could have been achieved better by a contrary finding on authorization.144 On the other hand, it does not clearly deny accountability either, since additional constitutional procedures are mandated regardless of
the authorization.

141. “Lawless” is a slight exaggeration; it is possible that morally despicable action is both affirmatively authorized by the political branches and not negatively circumscribed by the Bill of Rights.
142. In addition, in terms of style, Justice O’Connor’s opinion does not outwardly reject the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance. She repeats that, because she finds authorization, she need not “reach the
question whether Article II provides such authority [independently].” Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639. See
also id. (“Again, because we conclude that the Government’s second assertion [that AUMF authorized
detention] is correct, we do not address the first [that the NDA does not apply to civilian detentions].”).
143. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635.
144. Requiring clear and unmistakable congressional authorization was the virtue of Justice Scalia’s
opinion, which brought together the ideological odd couple of Scalia and Justice Stevens. Justice Scalia
argued that on these facts, Congress only had two constitutional options: prosecution for treason or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Congress should not shy and hide behind the shadows, and
rather be forced to “pull the trigger” if it wants such detentions carried out.

